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DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE
THE REQUIREMENT OF DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE-
A NECESSITY FOR FAIR TRIAL?
A RE-EXAMINATION of the procedures which are largely
responsible for the unnecessary expense and delay resulting
from mistrials should afford a basis for improvement of the ad-
ministration of criminal justice in the courts. If such procedures
are found desirable for the protection of the interests of the de-
fendant, they should be continued notwithstanding the added ex-
pense to the State; if, however, they have been retained for-
historical reasons only, and confer no deserved protection upon the
defendant, then revision would seem to be necessary. One such
factor, to which frequent mistrials in felony cases are attributable,
is the requirement that the defendant shall be present at all times
during the trial proper. For example, in a prosecution for murder,
the trial court commits reversible error if it replies in writing to
the jury's written request for further instructions without first
bringing the jury into open court and making its reply in the pres-
ence and hearing of the accused. This is true even though the court
had discussed proper procedure with counsel for the defense and
has been assured that the question will not be raised in event of
conviction.' It is also reversible error for the court to permit the
reproduction of testimony upon the request of the jury in the
absence of a defendant at liberty on bail, even though the defense
counsel has waived the client's presence at such proceedings.2 The
defendant is the only party who may waive his right to be present,
1 White v. State, 195 S. W. (2d) 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1946).
2Stroope v. State, 72 Ark. 379, 80 S. W. 749 (1904) ; Strasheim v. State, 294 N. W.
(Neb. 1940) ; Lee v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. Rep. 135, 161 S. W. (2d) 290 (1942) ; Onder-
donck v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. Rep. 296, 139 S. W. (2d) 589 (1940) ; Schafer v. State,
118 Tex. Crim. Rep. 500, 40 S. W. (2d) 147 (1931) ; Derden v. State, 56 Tex. Crim. Rep.
396, 120 S. W. 486 (1909) ; Hill v. State, 54 Tex. Crim. Rep. 646, 114 S. W. 117 (1908).
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and then only by appearing in open court and expressly stipulating
that he desires to do so.!
Article 580 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure' governing
the requirement of the defendant's presence is more effective than
comparable provisions in most other jurisdictions in eliminating
this basis for reversal, inasmuch as it creates a presumption of the
defendant's presence throughout the trial from a showing in the
record of his presence at any time during the trial, in the absence
of a showing in the record that the defendant was not present. And
it is held that where the record shows the defendant was absent,
but that such absence was voluntary, he is deemed to have waived
his right to be present.' However, Article 679 of the Code' provides
8 Crow v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. Rep. 149, 230 S. W. 148 (1921) ; Smith v. State, 61 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 328, 135 S. W. 154 (1911) ; Mapes v. State, 13 Tex. App. 85 (1882) ; Shipp
v. State, 11 Tex. App. 46 (1881). In Georgia, it is held that if counsel waives the de.
fendant's right in the presence of the defendant, this operates to estop the defendant
from denying later that said counsel did so without authority. Crymes v. State, 182 S. E.
856 (Ga. 1935) ; Cawthon v. State, 119 Ga. 395, 46 S. E. 897 (1903). One Texas case has
held that upon a motion for new trial, where the record showed that defendant's presence
was waived by counsel, it would be presumed that counsel had such authority. Escareno
v. State, 16 Tex. App. 85 (1884). Rule 43 of the new FED.RAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PRo-
cEltRE provides that although the defendant may waive his right to be present at felony
trials carrying less than a possible death penalty, in those cases where there is a possible
death penalty, his presence is mandatory and cannot be waived. New York follows a
similar procedure. People v. La Barbers, 274 N. Y. 339, 8 N. E. (2d) 884 (1937). West
Virginia, however, declares the presence of the defendant to be an inalienable right
which is not subject to waiver. W. VA. CODE (1931 c. 62, art. 3, § 2. For a discussion of
the application of this statute by the courts of that state see (1938).45 W. VA. L. Q. 82.
4 Tx. CODE Crtm. PRoc. (1925) art. 580, provides that "In all prosecutions for
felonies, the defendant must be personally present at the trial, and he must likewise be
present in all cases of misdemeanors when the punishment or any part thereof is imn.
prisonment in jail. When the record in the appellate court shows that the defendant was
present at the commencement, or any portion of the trial, it shall be presumed in the
absence of all evidence in the record to the contrary that he was present during the
whole trial." Missouri is the only state having a comparable provision. Mo. REV. STAT.(1919) § 4008. All other states indulge no such presumption that correct procedure was
followed by the lower court.
5 Some of the types of voluntary behavior which the courts have held to be a voluntary
absence amounting to a waiver of the defendant's right to be present are: where the
defendant's misconduct during trial necessitated his removal so that trial could proceed,
United States v. Davis, 25 Fed. Cas. 773, No. 14,923 (S. D. N. Y. 1869) ; where the
defendant's absence was due to voluntary intoxication, Ex parle Cassas, 112 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 100, 13 S. W. (2d) 869 (1929) ; where the defendant has escaped or forfeited his
recognizance, ARK. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 3972; COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 48, § 486;
MIss. CODE (1942) § 2519; OHIO COD. (Baldwin, 1940) § 13442-10; where the de-
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that his presence is mandatory at certain times during the proceed-
ings, with reference to which occasions, a voluntary absence will
not operate as a waiver.' The questions which are thus presented
by the Code provisions and the decisions thereunder are: (1)
whether defense counsel should not be permitted to waive the
requirement of defendant's presence at any time during the trial,
and (2) whether a defendant who avails himself of bail should
not be held to have waived thereby his right to be present at any
time during the trial.
The provisions of the Code were based upon the common law of
England;' yet the Legislature and the courts seem to have lost
sight of the reasons for the requirement of the defendant's presence
at common law. It has been pointed out that formerly in England,
a prisoner might be represented by counsel only in a trial for
treason or for a misdemeanor, but that in a felony case the accused
was required to defend himself without the aid of counsel.! For
this reason, it was necessary that in the latter situation the defend-
ant be present at every phase of the case. Because of practical
fendant was absent eating supper when the verdict was returned, Streich v. State, 78 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 155, 180 S. W. 266 (1915) ; and where the defendant voluntarily left the
room during proceedings without the knowledge of the court, Garcia v. State, 128 Tex.
Grim. Rep. 6, 79 S. W. (2d) 133 (1935) ; Ballou v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. Rep. 493, 22
S. W. (2d) 666 (1929) ; Whitehead v. State, 66 Tex. Grim. Rep. 482, 147 S. W. 583
(1912).
6 Tx. CODE CRIM. PRoc, (1925) art. 679, provides that "In felony, but not in mis.
demeanor cases, the defendant shall be present in the court when any such proceeding is
had as mentioned in the three preceeding articles and his counsel shall also be called."
The preceding articles referred to are: article 676 which provides the procedure to be
followed when the jury desires to communicate with the court, article 677 providing the
procedure to be followed when the jury desires to ask further instructions, and article
678 which provides the procedure whereby the jury may have a witness re-examined.
7See cases cited supra notes I and 2.
8 The Supreme Court of the United States in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1914),
and Lewis v. United States, 216 U. S. 611 (1914), declared that state statutes requiring
the presence of the accused are mere declarations of the common law. For an excellent
article tracing the adoption of the common law in Texas see Butte, Early Development
of Law and Equity in Texas (1917) 26 YALE: L. J. 699.
0 See Lehman, Criticism of Criminal Trial Procedure (1915) 63 U. oF PA. L. R-v.
609, 619.
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control over the defendant's case now exercised by counsel in
criminal trials, the early English requirement is certainly no longer
necessary for the reason which justified its adoption. Indeed, the
defendant, unless himself a lawyer, is at such a disadvantage in
attempting to participate in the conduct of proceedings in a modem
prosecution that there is very little he could do to affect proceedings
which could not better be done by counsel. It is likely to be far more
detrimental to the defendant for his counsel to be absent in view
of his greater competence in understanding the significance of each
development during the trial; yet it is held not to be error for de-
fense counsel to be absent,"° although the statute would seem to
require his presence at such proceedings also."
The presence of the defendant, not in itself an inalienable right,
is not guaranteed by either the United States or the Texas Constitu-
tions. It is, however, held by Texas courts to be a privilege neces-
sary for the enjoyment of the right of trial by jury guaranteed by
the Texas Constitution." As such, it has been held to be expressly
waivable,"' like all other privileges. It is rather the question of
implied waiver by reason of the defendant's voluntary absence
with which the Code fails to deal adequately.
Although Article 679 makes mere absence of the defendant at
the portions of the trial prescribed therein sufficient ground for re-
reversal, decisions of the Texas courts have tended to eliminate
10 Baker v. State, 58 Ark. 513, 25 S. W. 603 (1894) ; Onderdonck v. State, 139 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 296, 139 S. W. (2d) 589 (1940) ; McClellan v. State, 118 Tex. Crim. Rep.
473, 40 S. W. (2d) 87 (1931); Wesley v. State, 67 Tex. Crim. Rep. 507, 150 S. W. 197
(1912); Clemens v. State, 185 N. W. 209 (Wis. 1921); cl. Hart v. State, 95 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 566,255 S. W. 414 (1923) (both defendant and counsel were absent).
11 TEx. CODE CIUM. PROC. (1925) art. 679, provides that " . . . and his counsel
shall also be called." Complete citation is found in supra note 6.
12 The right of the accused to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury in all crim.
inal prosecutions is provided for in the TExAs CONSTUnON of 1876, Article I, Section
10. The court pointed out in Onderdonck v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. Rep. 296, 139 S. W.
(2d) 589 (1940), that article 679 was intended to give effect to the provision of the Bill
of Rights of the Texas Constitution guaranteeing a public trial.
Is TEx. Coo Cam. Pttoc. (1925) art. 11, provides that "the defendant in a ciminal
prosecution for any offense, may waive any right secured him by law except the fight of
trial by jury in a felony case when he enters a plea of not guilty." For decisions holding
that the defendant may waive his right to be present, see cases cited supra note 3.
[Vol. 1
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absence without resulting prejudice as a basis for reversal, and to
reverse only when the defendant's absence is shown to be actually
prejudicial to his cause when such absence occurred at other
phases of the trial.1 ' Earlier Texas cases had taken the view, as
at common law, that the defendant should be present at all times
no matter how inconsequential the proceedings at the moment in
question. 5 Later, the courts conceded that the defendant's presence
should be required only during the trial proper, reversal being
based on whether the absence was during such a part of the trial
as affected his substantive rights,"8 and such things as selection of
14 Where talesmen were examined during defendant's absence, there being no show.
ing of prejudice, the court held there was no reversible error in Boatright v. State, 118
Tex. Crim. Rep. 547, 42 S. W. (2d) 422 (1931) ; Speeglh v. State, 102 Tex. Grim. Rep.
500, 278 S. W. 427 (1926) ; Cartwright v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. Rep. 230, 259 S. W. 1085
(1924) ; O'Toole v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 578, 51 S. W. 244 (1899) ; Powers v. State,
23 Tex. App. 42, 5 S. W. 153,156 (1887). Where there was no showing of prejudice, the
court has refused, in the following cases, to grant reversals merely because defendant
was absent from other phases of the proceedings: Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309
(1914) (absence at verdict) ; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 (1933) ; State v.
Moore, 199 La. 564, 44 So. 299 (1907) (absence at a jury view) ; Ray v. State, 207 Ind.
370, 192 N. W. 751 (1934) ; Hair v. State, 16 Neb. 601 (1884) (absence during the testi-
mony of a witness) ; State v. Nardella, 108 N. J. Iaw 148, 154 At. 834 (1931) ; Common-
wealth v. Kelly, 292 Pa. 418, 141 At. 246 (1928) (absence at re-reading of instructions) ;
State v. McHaffa, 110 W. Va. 266,157 S. E. 595 (1931) (absence at motion for acquittal).
15 In Gibson v. State, 3 Tex. App. 437 (1878), the court defined a trial as the "whole
or any part of the procedure which the law provides for bringing offenders to justice."
Stating that a trial is not complete until the accused has had an opportunity, if desired, to
avail himself of his statutory right to present a motion for new trial in arrest of judgment,
the court granted a reversal because of the defendant's absence, and the court further
stated that after indictment nothing should be done in the cause in the absence of the
prisoner. Other phases of the trial, at which defendant's presence was formerly held to
be essential, but which are no longer considered to be substantive parts of the trial are
indicated by the following cases: Crow v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. Rep. 149, 230 S. W. 148
(1921) (excusing juror for sickness) ; Upchurch v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 624, 38 S.
W. 206 (1896) ; Rudder v. State, 29 Tex. App. 262, 15 S. W. 717 (1890) (discharge of
jury) ; Madison v. State, 17 Tex. App. 479 (1885) (entering judgment) ; Mapes v. State,
13 Tex. App. 85 (1882) (pronouncement of sentence).
I6 FED. RULES Ctst. PRoc. (1946) Rule 52(a), provides that "any error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantive rights shall be disregarded."
"Substantive rights" has been defined in Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co. v.
Novotny, 200 Iowa 227, 202 N. W. 588 (1925), as "those rights enjoyed under the legal
system before disturbance of normal relations"; that is to say, those rights the enjoy-
ment of which are secured to a person by law. The AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE O
CRIMINAL PROcEDURE (1930) § 287, sets down the following seven phases of the trial as
being of a nature requiring the presence of the defendant: (1) the arraignment, (2)
when a plea of guilty is made, (3) at the calling, examination, challenging, impanelling
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special venire," motions for change of venue,"8 and ministerial acts
of recording by the court clerks"9 are no longer considered sub-
stantive portions of the trial. A practical solution to the difficulty
created by defendant's absence in prosecutions in Texas has been
the staying of pr6ceedings upon discovery of his absence until
his return at which time he is given an. opportunity to waive that
part of the proceedings which took place during his absence, or in
the alternative, of having that part of the trial repeated;"' thus a
reversal based upon absence alone can be precluded if there is no
showing that proceedings during his absence were prejudicial.
Serious difficulty has been created by the conflict between the
requirement of defendant's presence and the right of bail guar-
anteed to the defendant by the Texas Constitution."' This difficulty,
moreover, will continue so long as absence on bail is not held to
be a voluntary absence of the defendant operating as a waiver of
and swearing of tile jury, (4) at all proceedings before the court when the jury is
present, (5) when evidence is addressed to the court out of the presence of the jury for
the purpose of laying the foundation for the introduction of evidence before the jury,
(6) at a view by the jury, and (7) at the rendition of the verdict. This section further
provides that, where the defendant is voluntarily absent, all but the first two phases
mentioned may proceed in his absence. Although most states have more or less adopted
this procedure in the event of the defendant's absence during a substantive portion of
the trial, Texas continues to treat the motion for new trial as being a basic part of the
trial. For a more complete discussion of defendant's presence during particular portions
of the trial see (1944) 20 INn. L. J. 181; (1941) 20 NEBt. L. REv. 47; (1943) 41 MICH. L.
REv. 966; (1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 852.
1? Oliver v. State, 70 Tex. Crim. Rep. 140, 159 S. W. 235 (1913).
18 Littleton v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. Rep. 205, 239 S. W. 202 (1922) ; Rothschild v.
State, 7 Tex. App. 519 (1880).
11, People v. Johnson, 140 Cal. App. 729, 35 P. (2d) 1074 (1934) ; Powers v. State, 23
Tex. App. 42,5 S. W. 153 (1887).
0 People v. LaMunion, 62 Mich. 709 (1887) ; State v. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont. 33.
55 P. 1026 (1899) ; Hair v. State, 16 Neb. 601, 21 N. W. 464 (1884) ; State v. Paylor, 89
N. C. 539 (1883) ; Garcia v. State, 128 Tex. Crim. Rep. 547, 42 S. W. (2d) 422 (1935) ;
Sullivan v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. Rep. 170, 233 S. W. 986 (1921) ; Cason v. State, 52 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 220,106 S. W. 337 (1907) ; O'Toole v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 580, 51 S. W.
244 (1899).
21 TEx. CoNsT. (1876) Art. I, § 11, provides that "all prisoners shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses, when the proof is evident; but this provi.
sion shall not be so construed as to prevent bail after indictment found upon examination
of the evidence, in such manner as may be prescribed by law."
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his right to be present." One at liberty on bail is not required to
be remanded to jail during the trial but is permitted to remain at
large until a verdict of guilty is returned;"' nevertheless, it is re.
versible error for the proceedings specified in Article 679 to be
conducted in the defendant's absence even though the defendant
has availed himself of this encouragement to his absence from the
trial. A "voluntary" absence, as defined by the Court of Criminal
Appeals, is one which results "from choice or exercise of the
will. '24 Can it not be said that a defendant availing himself of
bail during trial has voluntarily absented himself therefrom?
After having exercised his choice, he should not thereafter be
heard to complain of anything which takes place during his ab-
sence, especially if his counsel is present. Certainly, if the defend-
ant is voluntarily absent on bail, his counsel should be allowed to
waive the defendant's right to be present, as it may be said that
by reason of his being absent, the defendant has given implied
authority for the making of such waiver. The new Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure"' allow proceedings to continue through
the rendition of the verdict in all cases except those involving a
possible death penalty, if the defendant voluntarily absents himself
after the trial has commenced. Moreover, the American Law
Institute in its proposed Model Code of Criminal Procedure"6 also
approves the continuation of proceedings through the verdict in
22 Hill v. State, 54 Tex. Crim. Rep. 646, 114 S. W. 117 (1908).
23 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. (1925) art. 582, provides that "where the accused is on
bail when the trial 'commences, such bail shall not thereby be considered as discharged
until the jury shall return into court a verdict of guilty or not guilty. He shall have the
same right to have and remain on bail during the trial of his case and up to the return
into court of such verdict as under the law he has before the trial commences; but
immediately upon the return into court of a verdict of guilty, he shall be placed in the
custody of the sheriff, and his bail considered discharged. Where the accused is con-
victed in a misdemeanor case and is on bail when the trial commences, such bail shall
not thereby be considered discharged until the defendant's motion for a new trial has
been overruled by the court."
-4 Derden v. State, 56 Tex. Crim. Rep. 396, 403, 120 S. W. 486, 488 (1909).
25 FEo. RULES CRIM. PROC. (1946) Rule 43.
2SAMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE CrIM. PROC. (1930) § 287.
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defendant's voluntary absence, his presence being mandatory
under the Code only at the arraignment, at the time of a plea of
guilty, and at pronouncement of sentence, though his presence
may also be required for purposes of identification.27
In Texas in a prosecution for a misdemeanor not punishable
by a jail sentence, the defendant is not required to appear in person
at any part of the trial but is permitted to appear by counsel only,
with the consent of the State's attorney. 8 The federal courts and
the vast majority of the states now have similar provisions. While
it is true that more severe consequences face the unsuccessful
defendant in a felony prosecution than in one for a misdemeanor,
the requirement of presence no longer bears any practical relation
to the effectiveness of the case presented by the defense, if the de-
fendant is represented by counsel.
It may be suggested that Article 580 of the Code should be re-
vised to read:
In all prosecutions for felonies or for misdemeanors where the
punishment or any part thereof is imprisonment in jail, the defendant
shall be personally present at the arraignment and when a plea of
guilty is made, and if after trial has commenced, he voluntarily leaves
or absents himself, then trial shall proceed as if he were present at all
times.
This should be supplemented by a revision of Article 679 of the
Code as follows:
In felony, but not in misdemeanor cases, where the defendant re-
mains in custody, the defendant shall be present in the court when any
such proceeding is had as mentioned in the three preceeding articles,
and his counsel shall be called also, if immediately available. In all
cases where the defendant is on bail, his presence shall not be required,
but the presence of his counsel shall be deemed suficient.
2,7 Id., § 290.
2s TKt. CODE CRIM. Psoc. (1925) art. 581, provides that "in other misdemeanor cases
(than those involving a jail sentence), the defendant may, by consent of the State's
attorney, appear by counsel and the trial may proceed without his personal presence."
[Vol. 1
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If such changes are incorporated into the Code or rules of pro-
cedure, the defendant will be adequately protected by his being
apprised upon arraignment of the crime with which he is charged,
and, thus, put upon notice as to the occasion for his presence at
trial; moreover, the state will be saved the expense of unnecessary
and costly prosecution resulting from a merely technical require-
ment which is not necessary for insuring to the defendant a fair
and just trial.
Tom E. Bryan.
